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University governance and rankings. 
The ambivalent role of rankings for autonomy, 
accountability and competition
Theodor Leiber
Although university rankings are controversial, they are still widely used to an increas-
ing extent. It is even claimed that they are involved in strategy processes of universi-
ties. This paper analyses this far-reaching hypothesis by exploring the role of rankings 
for institutional autonomy, accountability and competition in a selected sample of six 
German universities. It turns out that the universities are reflectedly committed to 
rankings but, because of their methodological ambivalences, do not use rankings in 
strategy and decision-making. The paper closes with conclusions for realistic 
approaches towards rankings, according to which current league table rankings cannot 
be systematically integrated into university governance. This is because ranking indica-
tors often do not represent reliable quality measures and the rank list data are usually 
highly aggregated thereby obscuring causal linkages the knowledge of which would 
be necessary for strategic interventions. 
Universitätsgovernance und Rankings. Die ambivalente Rolle 
von Rankings für Autonomie, Rechenschaft und Wettbewerb
Obwohl Hochschulrankings umstritten sind, werden sie immer noch zunehmend 
genutzt. Es wird sogar behauptet, dass sie in Strategieprozesse von Universitäten 
einbezogen sind. Diese weitreichende Hypothese wird analysiert, indem die Rolle von 
Rankings für institutionelle Autonomie, Rechenschaftslegung und Wettbewerb für 
sechs Fallbeispiele deutscher Universitäten untersucht wird. Es zeigt sich, dass die 
Universitäten reflektiert mit Rankings umgehen, sie aber aufgrund ihrer methodischen 
Ambivalenzen in Strategie und Entscheidungsfindung nicht verwenden. Der Aufsatz 
schließt mit Folgerungen für einen realistischen Umgang mit Rankings, wonach der-
zeitige Liga-Tabellen-Rankings nicht systematisch in die Hochschul-Governance inte-
grierbar sind. Der Grund ist, dass Rankingindikatoren oft keine verlässlichen Qualitäts-
maße repräsentieren und Rankingdaten gewöhnlich hoch aggregiert sind, wodurch 
kausale Verknüpfungen verdeckt werden, deren Kenntnis für strategische Interventio-
nen erforderlich wäre. 
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1  Introduction
According to Andrejs Rauhvargers, university rankings have “galvanised the world of 
higher education” (Rauhvargers 2011, p. 68), “universities have been unable to avoid 
national and international comparisons, and this has caused changes in the way uni-
versities function” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Christopher C. Morphew and Christopher 
Swanson state that “universities have adopted the use of rankings as a means of 
assuring internal actors that the institution is on course towards its goals” (Morphew/
Swanson 2011, p. 185), and universities “use rankings as a signal flare, to highlight 
their quality for external constituents” (ibid.), and as “a communicative tool […] to 
provide both informational and promotional properties to internal and external con-
stituents alike” (ibid., p. 186). According to these authors, the main reason why rank-
ings have become so ostensibly prominent within a decade is that “rankings provide 
a seemingly objective input into any discussion or assessment of what constitutes 
quality in higher education” (ibid.). In this context, it is even propagated that “govern-
ing bodies of institutions of higher education use rankings” “to determine policies to 
achieve excellence” (IREG 2015, p. 4). 
At the same time, however, there is profound and justifiable methodological criticism 
of rankings from a social science perspective, as well as by many academic staff and 
the operational side of university practitioners dealing with quality issues: for example, 
problems are identified relating to data quality and aggregation, deficient performance 
alignment of indicators, missing transparency of data acquisition and processing (Dill/
Soo 2005; Kroth/Daniel 2008; Marginson 2014; Schmoch 2015; Westerheijden 2015). 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the role of rankings in university governance, 
particularly institutional autonomy, accountability and competition. To that end, the 
theoretical background is briefly introduced at first. Secondly, the six German sample 
universities, research questions and methodology are characterised. Thirdly, the 
empirical results are presented. The paper ends with some conclusions about the very 
limited role of rankings in integrative university governance. 
2   Integrative University Governance and the Interplay Between Autonomy, 
 Accountability and Competition 
Current research literature shows that an appropriate governance model of universities 
as “specific” (Musselin 2007), rather “porous” organisations (Huisman 2016, p. 200) 
and “distinctive social institutions” (Berdahl 1990, p. 170) comprises the integrated 
governance core functions of institutional autonomy, accountability and competition 
(Berdahl 1990; Huisman/Currie 2004; King 2015; Kumar 1987; Marginson 2006; Puc-
ciarelli/Kaplan 2016; Schedler 1999; Schindler et al. 2015; Sinclair 1995; Stensaker/
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Harvey 2011; Zaman 2015). The literature also exhibits that, in public administration in 
general and particularly in higher education, autonomy, accountability and competition 
are “complex and chameleon-like term[s]” (Mulgan 2000, p. 555), “cherished 
concept[s], sought after but elusive” (Sinclair 1995, p. 219). 
Nevertheless, these governance core functions characterise a complex, hybrid model 
of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1991) for universities as specific organisations and 
can be defined as follows: In biology and sociology, competition is the contest between 
two or more metabolic systems for resources and goods. Examples are organisms 
striving for food; animals competing for territory, food, mates, leadership; social groups 
and institutions striving for recognition, awards, leadership; business companies 
competing with other firms over the same group of customers. In analogy, typically a 
few hundred universities compete for positions in rankings about research output and 
impact, awards, students, learning outcomes, output and impact of Third Mission, 
academic staff, institutional prestige, etc. Since rankings are a specific type of selected 
and highly aggregated performance assessment, it is clear from the outset that they 
constitute only one specific mechanism or measure of competition in higher education. 
Accountability in ethics and governance means liability or assumption of responsibility 
of organisations, groups and individual persons for their decisions, actions and products: 
“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions 
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual mis-
conduct” (Schedler 1999, p. 17). Accordingly, higher education institutions are account-
able to their immediate “customers” (e. g. students, staff, employers), public and 
private financial funders and sponsors (e. g. government, public, research funders, etc.) 
on a moral level, and, to an increasing extent, on a legal level, i. e. against higher 
education law and funding contracts because universities are obliged by these to 
inform funders and sponsors about their (past or future) actions and decisions and 
“products”, to justify them. Otherwise, universities might suffer “punishment” (e. g. 
decrease of funding and reputation; decrease of student numbers) in the case of 
eventual “misconduct”. This corresponds to the following functions of accountability: 
constraining “arbitrary power, thereby discouraging fraud and manipulation, and 
strengthening the legitimacy of institutions that are obligated to report to appropriate 
groups” (Huisman/Currie 2004, p. 531); sustaining or raising “the quality of perfor-
mance by forcing those involved to examine their operations critically and to subject 
them to critical review from outside” (ibid.); regulating institutions’ activities “through 
the kind of reports and the explicit and implicit criteria to be met by the reporting 
institutions” (ibid.).
Literally, the concept of autonomy (from the ancient Greek αύτονομία) means self-
legislation. It usually comprises self-determination, sovereignty, self-governance. In 
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the words of famous philosopher Immanuel Kant “the principle of autonomy is thus: 
‘Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one’s choice are at the same 
time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law’” (Kant 2002, p. 58). 
By analogy, institutional autonomy would refer to organisations who give themselves 
universal rules and follow these rules. Thus, institutional autonomy corresponds to 
“organisational identity” (Whetten 2006) or self-understanding as far as the institution 
itself can determine: why the institution exists, what its goals are, how it strives for 
its goals (mission); what its values are as a basis of decision-making and action-taking; 
where the institution hopes these purposes will lead, and what an institution wants 
to become in the future (vision) (Leiber 2016, pp. 102–104). Such self-given rules can 
and should be contained in: statutes; mission statements (values, mission, vision); 
structure and (strategy) development plans; quality management models; etc. Thus, 
institutional autonomy and organisational identity can be implemented by integrated 
performance governance which is based on a mission statement, including mission, 
vision and values; comprehensive performance assessment; transparent reporting 
system. Accordingly, further basic governance requirements are a high degree of 
agreement on objectives; a powerful and relevant quality management system (includ-
ing collection, analysis and use of data and information); trusting communication 
structures; options for stakeholders’ participation in performance assessments. 
In this sense, organisational identity is indispensable for the definition and systematic 
development of organisational quality enhancement in autonomous universities which 
is implemented via responsible and competitive self-governance and is based on 
values, missions, visions and various quality assessment processes (such as accredi-
tation, evaluation, etc.). In other words, organisational identity is a necessary core 
element of cooperative, collective, networked societal “enterprises” such as universi-
ties which are or want to become responsible (i. e. accountable), competitive and 
self-reliant players in complex knowledge societies. Particularly, universities cannot 
avoid competing for academics, students, research projects, funds, etc. in an era of 
international and global competition for knowledge, research, welfare, economies and 
mass higher education.
Against this background, the role of rankings for institutional autonomy, accountability 
and competition can be described as follows: Institutional autonomy is synonymous 
for establishing integrated performance governance which has to organise and balance 
the dynamic interplay of functions, needs and requirements from inside and outside 
of the modern university: higher education law; funders and donors; markets and 
networks (e. g. comprising competition for students, staff, research funding); etc. 
Usually, funders, recipients of performance, evaluations, accreditations, benchmarking, 
ratings, rankings etc. assess certain types and areas of university performance at very 
different levels and to a very wide range of empirical reliability. These various assess-
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ments normally can fulfil both, competition and accountability functions. Obviously, 
(league table) rankings represent just one, very specific performance valuation mech-
anism (see Figure) which is based on highly aggregated data and information which 
are rather easily communicated as compared to much more complex and comprehen-
sive accreditation or evaluation assessments.
Figure:  Simplified scheme of the interplay between institutional autonomy and 
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In contemporary higher education in knowledge societies, competition is ubiquitous 
(Pucciarelli/Kaplan 2016), certainly ambivalent and appears in different forms and 
intensities throughout the globe. Competition is generally conducted through markets 
(e. g. offer of study places and demand of students) and networks (e. g. benchlearning 
networks of universities) which produce input (e. g. comparative benchmarks with 
respect to performance; declining student numbers) relevant to strategic self-govern-
ance decisions and actions that are the expression and consequence of institutional 
autonomy and should exert strategic influence on the various performance levels (see 
Figure). Thus, there is “the need to enhance prestige and market share” (Pucciarelli/
Kaplan 2016, p. 311); “to embrace an entrepreneurial mindset” (ibid.); “to expand 
interactions and value co-creation with key stakeholders” (ibid.). This can be achieved 
through intensified “entrepreneurial activities” (Sam/van der Sijde 2014, pp. 900 ff.) 
comprising the effective and integrative organisation and governance of teaching, 
research, and Third Mission, including the preservation of the university’s societal roles 
in cultural and academic education, personality development and vocational training.
Beiträge zur Hochschulforschung, 39. Jahrgang, 3-4/2017 35
University governance and rankings
In universities, accountability of achievements – quality; effectiveness; efficiency – 
occurs against various organisational levels, higher education politics and higher 
education law as well as other funders and donors (see Figure). Accordingly, academic 
accountability, political and legal accountability, financial accountability and competitive 
accountability can be distinguished which “reflect the different control systems that 
are laid upon institutions” (King 2015, p. 488) such as academic self-control based on 
institutional autonomy, “control based on the state’s ability to promulgate rules, to 
monitor for compliance and to apply sanctions when necessary” (ibid.), efficiency 
responsibility against donors and funders, and “accountability flowing from the disci-
pline exercised on prices and quality from the aggregation of individual decisions by 
buyers and sellers in competitive conditions” (ibid.), respectively. 
3  University Governance and Rankings 
3.1  The Sample Universities, Research Questions and Methodology
The sample of this study consists of six universities in the German federal state of 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, the universities of Freiburg, Heidelberg, Hohenheim, Con-
stance, Mannheim and Ulm. Seven structured interviews with their ranking experts 
were carried out. With respect to size (as represented by the number of students) the 
six surveyed universities range from approximately 9,000 to 31,000 students. Overall, 
the academic and teaching profiles of these institutions are rather different: one of 
them offers a comprehensive range of subjects excluding medicine, one of them has 
a distinct bioscience and agricultural focus, one has an economy focus, one is focused 
on natural sciences and medicine, and two of them offer a comprehensive range of 
subjects including medicine. Most of the sample universities are usually among the 
first two hundred in certain rankings, while only one of them usually reaches the group 
of the first fifty.
It should be emphasised that German higher education institutions are characterised 
by the following features which set the general framework for their dealing with rank-
ings: they are embedded in a social market economy and have low levels of market 
focus (e. g. they offer broad access to higher education, i. e. comprehensive selection 
procedures for students are not applied; no tuition fees are charged in public universi-
ties; no strong differentiation of the performance of different institutions of the same 
type). Thus, if competitiveness is measured by league table rankings, the German 
higher education system can be characterised as less competitive when compared to 
the American, British or Australian systems, for example. Furthermore, the sample 
universities’ scheme of legal (and financial) accountability is characterized by the 
stipulations in the higher education law of Baden-Wuerttemberg: institutions have to 
accredit their study programmes or the institution; establish a quality management 
system; carry out regular (external) evaluations; deliver annual reports (including cost 
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and performance calculation; implementation of university contracts and target agree-
ments; results of evaluations). In other words, many accountability measures and 
particularly rankings are not determined by law.
In view of the remarks in the Introduction, this paper intends to answer the following 
questions which appear to be relevant when the role of rankings in university govern-
ance is investigated: How do the German sample universities deal with the methodo-
logical subtleties of rankings? For which stakeholders are the ranking results important? 
Do (league table) rankings influence decision-making and strategy of the sample 
universities? Do rankings challenge institutional autonomy or organisational identity?
The methodology of this study relies on analysis of documents and rankings, structured 
interviews on the role and importance of rankings. The interviews were conducted 
with the universities’ ranking managers and rectorate members. The interview ques-
tionnaire consisted of 18 questions which contained around 170 answer options while 
most questions (where appropriate) also had open answer options. Based on an 
approach which was recently applied by Ellen Hazelkorn et al. (2014), the following 
items were utilised in the interviews: Which rankings are rated as the most influential 
and which rankings are supplied with university data? How is the monitoring of rank-
ings organised? Who uses the results of monitoring rankings, and for what purposes? 
Which aspects of institutional strategy and performance are influenced by rankings?
3.2  Empirical Exploration and Key Results 
3.2.1  Use of Rankings
All interview partners assess a limited number of global and national rankings as “most 
influential” for their needs and, with only one exception, regularly deliver1 data to the 
following four ranking organisations: Times Higher Education (THE) Ranking; Quac-
quarelli Symonds World Best University (QSWBU) Rankings; Academic Ranking of 
World Universities (ARWU; Shanghai Ranking); Centre for Higher Education (CHE) 
Ranking (national rating of learning and teaching) (see Table 1). One smaller university 
with a comprehensive range of subjects excluding medicine rates ARWU “inappropriate”2 
because of ARWU’s focus on Web of Science and absolute indicator numbers; another 
smaller university, which has an economy focus and lacks natural sciences, assesses 
ARWU as “unattainable”; therefore, both universities do not actively participate in 
ARWU (see Table 1). 
1  If a university does not deliver data to a ranking organisation, this does not necessarily imply that the uni-
versity is not ranked: for example, all six sample universities are ranked in Scimago Institutions Ranking and 
U-Multirank, although some of them explicitly refused participation.
2  Throughout, citations from the interviews are anonymised; written citations are formulated as closely as 
possible to the spoken and annotated words from the interviews.
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Table 1:  Most influential rankings and university participation
Rankings Most influential rankings – 
relative proportion of sample 
universities
Regular participation – 
 relative proportion of sample 
universities
Times Higher Education (THE) 6/6 6/6
Quacquarelli Symonds World Best 
 University (QSWBU)
6/6 6/6
Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU)
6/6 4/6 
Centre for Science and Technology 
 Studies (CWTS) Leiden
2/6 2/6
US News Best Global Universities 
(USNBGU) Rankings
2/6 2/6
National Taiwan University (NTU) 
Ranking
1/6 1/6
Scimago Institutions Ranking (SIR) 0/6 0/6
EU-Multirank 3/6 3/6
CHE Ranking 6/6 6/6
DFG Funding Atlas 2/6 6/6




According to the interviews, the main rationale of some sample universities for ignor-
ing CWTS Leiden is threefold: firstly, CWTS’s advertising and approaching possible 
customers is by far not as active as compared to commercial providers (since CWTS 
is organised by not-for-profit academics); secondly, the focus on very specific biblio-
metric data considerably limits communication of CWTS data with a broader, non-
specialized public; thirdly, the bibliometric focus is usually only promising for institutions 
that have many research-intensive fields in the sciences, mathematics and medicine, 
while smaller universities with less research output in these fields and a great deal in 
social sciences and humanities cannot take advantage of the CWTS Leiden criteria. 
Therefore, it is plausible that a larger sample university with a comprehensive range 
of subjects uses CWTS Leiden (though another university of comparable type does 
not), while it is not so clear that a smaller university with a subject focus outside the 
natural sciences also participates in CWTS (cf. Table 1). 
It is interesting to note that the three favourite global league table rankings – THE, 
QSWBU, ARWU – are those which are more problematic from a social science per-
spective (cf. Marginson 2014, pp. 48–50). The interviews reveal, however, that the 
main reason for the universities’ preference is not the social science quality of the 
rankings, but simply that external stakeholders such as funders, international coop-
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eration partners and higher education politicians request the positioning in these 
rankings. On the contrary, methodologically preferable rankings such as CWTS Leiden, 
Scimago Institutions Ranking (SIR) and U-Multirank (ibid.) are more rarely used (CWTS; 
U-Multirank) or even unknown (SIR), because these rankings are not requested by 
stakeholders. In addition, for the sample universities with a comprehensive range of 
subjects, data provision for U-Multirank is currently too costly (compared to the wide-
spread non-familiarity of the ranking in relevant stakeholder groups) and U-Multirank’s 
handling in the communication market is too complex (no single score but a multi-rank 
rating!). 
Some universities are interested in US News Best Global Universities (USNBGU) 
Rankings and National Taiwan University (NTU) Ranking because they are quite highly 
ranked in certain disciplines (e. g. Agricultural Sciences). Finally, the German Research 
Society (DFG) Funding Atlas (amount of third-party income) is assessed as one of the 
“most influential” rankings by two of the sample universities, a larger one and a smaller 
one, both offering a comprehensive set of subjects. 
According to the interviews, the sample universities use their favourite global rankings 
– ARWU; THE; QSWBU – primarily for competition purposes in a global knowledge 
arena: In the context of marketing and advertising the sample universities aim to 
intensify recruitment of international staff and students; the universities have some 
general survey feedback that up to 50 percent of students use ranking results in their 
decision for a university.3 It is obvious, however, that this function of rankings is not 
as important in Germany as, for example, in Australia where approximately one third 
of all students (who are normally fee payers) come from abroad (mostly from East and 
Southeast Asia). Another competition purpose lies in the enhancement of the organi-
sational image – how others see the organisation from the outside – or external repu-
tation. Rankings can fulfil this function, albeit in a superficial way, and the sample 
universities want to take advantage of this function. Furthermore, the sample univer-
sities frequently use institutional rankings for initial screening of partner universities 
and pre-analysis of (cooperation) requests and potential incoming guests on the 
international level. The surveyed university representatives also say that they frequently 
mention high ranking results in research proposals and project applications; from suc-
cessful funding applications and the informal feedback of funders, the universities 
reasonably assume that funders value their reference to rankings if the ranks are 
comparatively high (but the interview partners do not have systematic feedback or 
impact analysis about this). 
3  This aspect could not be further analysed in the present study.
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Finally, (selective) benchmarking is an objective of the surveyed universities, but they 
are very critical, if not completely sceptical, whether rankings can be useful for bench-
marking. In addition, systematic benchmarking is still in a very early development stage 
because the sample universities find it difficult to identify benchmarking partners who 
have a sufficiently similar profile. On the one hand, it is currently not clear whether 
progress is possible in this respect and the sample universities seem to be reluctant 
to put more effort into this because of low success expectations. On the other hand, 
however, some sample universities – the larger ones who offer a comprehensive range 
of subjects and tend to have the necessary resources – are intending to develop their 
“own benchmarking system” based on a comprehensive indicator set and a reporting 
system, including all performance areas. As a first step, they are currently developing 
a research information system which is hoped to be helpful in the ranking game. The 
need for methodological reflection and conjoint, cross-institutional strategy for dealing 
with rankings is also expressed by few smaller universities since they sometimes feel 
isolated in their efforts to handle rankings efficiently. 
According to the surveys, all sample universities organise their dealing with rankings 
by one or several persons at institutional level who regularly monitor the positioning 
in rankings while specialist institutional units are not established. Regular discussion 
platforms dealing with rankings at institutional level are reported by only one smaller 
university (Table 2). In other words, the universities monitor and analyse ranking results 
with least effort in a centralised and focused way and they do not invest much into 
broader discussion platforms about rankings – because they believe that such invest-
ment would not be worthwhile (see below). 
Table 2:  Organisational university structures for monitoring rankings 
Organisational university structures for monitoring rankings Relative proportion of 
 sample universities
Specialist institutional unit which regularly monitors the positioning in 
rankings
0/6
One or several persons at institutional level who regularly monitor the posi-
tioning in rankings
6/6
Rankings issues are discussed on a regular basis on platforms (commit-
tees, meetings, …) organised at institutional level
1/6
One or several persons at faculty level who regularly monitor the position-
ing in rankings
1/6 
(error-prone: no interviewees 
from faculty level)
Rankings issues are discussed on a regular basis on platforms (commit-
tees, meetings, …) organised at faculty level
0/6
(error-prone: no interviewees 
from faculty level)
Other 0/6
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This interpretation reaffirms the hypothesis that internal university stakeholders, who 
process ranking information, are usually few ranking experts on the operational level 
as well as members of leadership, the rector, the president, and the faculty deans 
(Table 3). 
Table 3:  Internal university stakeholders who process ranking information
Internal university stakeholders who process ranking information Relative proportion of 
 sample universities
A board, senate or equivalent governing body at institutional level 1/6
University council 2/6
Rector, president, vice-chancellor or equivalent 6/6
Rectorate office 1/6
Head of university administration or equivalent highest administrative 
position
1/6
Committees or working groups at institutional level 1/6
Dean or equivalent leader at faculty level 6/6
Committees or working groups at faculty level 1/6
International Office 1/6
Other 0/6
All sample universities use ranking results for marketing and publicity, either regularly 
or occasionally, while the majority of institutions uses rankings for advertisement only 
if the ranking position has changed from previous ranking editions in a positive direc-
tion. The favourite measures of advertisement are websites and various promotional 
material (Table 4). 
Table 4:  Use of rankings for marketing and publicity purposes




Yes, but only if the position has changed from previous ranking editions 1/6





Via promotional material (e. g. social media; press releases; media cam-
paigns; targeted information for partners)
4/6
Via public events (e. g. conferences; meetings with donors) 1/6
Other 0/6
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At the same time, in the interviews rankings are classified as very ambivalent and, 
according to all interview partners, the “importance of ranking lists is not very high” 
for the following reasons: various procedures for defining, collecting and ordering the 
complex data required for the ranking cause difficulties and deviations (“data collection 
problems”). The vice-rector of a large comprehensive university was even cited with 
the statement that “rankings are an absurdity we nevertheless have to deal with.” In 
general, for surveyees the “data aggregation level is too high to be informative for 
institutional sub-levels such as faculties, subject fields, etc.”; particularly, this “high 
aggregation level is very problematic for universities which have a broad spectrum of 
subject fields.” Also, “global rankings are too much tailored to Anglo-American uni-
versities”, and “study programmes with state examinations and diplomas cannot be 
adequately mapped in global rankings” because they are not considered by definition. 
3.2.2 Influence of Rankings on Institutional Strategy and Performance
According to half or more of the interviewed universities’ ranking specialists, the deci-
sions of researchers and teachers about a university are usually not influenced by 
highly aggregated rankings because these stakeholders know about the methodo-
logical weaknesses of rankings; therefore, they are instead guided by research profiles 
of disciplines and subjects (systematic data, however, is not available about this in the 
sample universities). In turn, this means that half or almost half of the universities think 
that prospective staff’s decisions are influenced by rankings; in fact, some prominent 
competitive gains are reported where subject-specific rankings were used by prospec-
tive staff as a basis for decision-making.4 The following external stakeholders are 
influenced in their university-related decisions by rankings according to the view of 
more universities: employers; funding bodies and sponsors; parents; the ministry; 
(prospective) partner institutions; prospective students (Table 5). The external stake-
holders who are more probably influenced by rankings are also advertised by more 
universities (Table 5). 
4  The cases are unspecific with respect to size, rank and reputation of the universities.
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Table 5:  External stakeholder groups influenced by rankings
Stakeholder groups Relative proportion of sample 
universities who see stake-
holders influenced by rankings
Relative proportion of 
 sample universities who 
advertise stakeholders
Prospective research staff 3/6 –
Prospective teaching staff 2/6 –
Prospective students 6/6 6/6
Partner or prospective partner 
 institutions
5/6 6/6




Benefactors, sponsors, investors 4/6 6/6





Regional/local authorities or similar 
agencies
3/6 3/6
The media – 5/6
The local/regional community – 1/6
The wider public – 2/6
Other 0/6 0/6
In student surveys reported by the sample universities, up to approximately 50 percent 
of students say that rankings have been important or rather important for their univer-
sity choice. This is plausible if the students refer to rankings which focus on general 
reputation, learning environment, quality of life of the city and teaching quality (e. g. 
CHE Ranking; Campus Ranking). Global league table rankings do also influence the 
decisions of prospective cooperation partners in research (mostly from Asia), which 
is quite legitimate as far as most of these rankings (e. g. THE; QSWBU; ARWU) focus 
on research. According to the knowledge of respondents, parents of international 
students see rankings in “safety” and “environment” of the place as important; this 
is a plausible co-factor for decision-making – if the rankings have relevant indicators 
and reliable data for the requested features. 
From the interviews it can also be concluded, again without apparent differences 
between the six sample universities, that the presence and broad public appeal of the 
various global league table rankings appear to apply pressure to the sample institutions 
to improve institutional capacities for systematically dealing with rankings; particularly 
they have established staff positions at the institutional level to regularly monitor and 
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analyse the positioning in rankings (see Table 2). In other words, the sample universi-
ties have been increasingly investing (though still to a moderate extent) in ranking 
analyses and systematic participation in rankings during the last (three to five) years. 
In general terms, according to the interviewees, the reason for this increase of invest-
ment is the competition-induced inevitability for dealing with rankings and the expec-
tation that having high ranking positions raises the institution’s visibility, may enhance 
its prestige, and therefore its attractiveness for quality students and academics. 
The main question in this study is how universities’ handling of rankings interrelates 
with the institutions’ governance: What is the role of rankings in the interplay between 
institutional autonomy, accountability and competition? The interviews reveal that the 
sample universities use rankings mainly for the fulfilment of competitive and political 
accountability: occasionally, against international (usually Asian) cooperation partners 
(usually only at request); regularly, against higher education politics (always slightly 
concerned over potential threats of over- or misinterpretation, although, ranking results 
do not influence the allocation of public universities’ budgets in Germany); occasionally, 
towards society insofar as ranking results are communicated to a broader public via 
websites, press releases, etc. (accountability is combined with self-advertising). 
For a large and traditional sample university, rankings – THE, QSWBU, ARWU, CHE, 
EU-Multirank, CWTS Leiden, USNBGU, NTU, DFG Funding Atlas (see Table 1) – play 
no role in institutional strategy. Four universities say that rankings play a role, but 
without having formulated a clear target with respect to ranking positions. A smaller, 
specialized university formulated the goal of reaching the Top 100 in THE (Table 6). 
However, as further data show, these alleged strategic roles are rather informal, implicit 
and diffusive. 
Table 6:  Rankings’ role in institutional strategy
Rankings play a role in institutional strategy Relative proportion of 
 sample universities
Yes, clear target formulated with respect to position in national rankings 0/6
Yes, clear target formulated with respect to position in international 
 rankings
1/6
Yes, no target formulated with respect to position in rankings 4/6
No 1/6
Actually, it turns out that, in the respondents’ view, only very few strategic actions are 
causally influenced by ranking results (see Tables 7 and 8), because of the methodo-
logical weaknesses of the rankings, particularly high aggregation levels of data and 
unreliable measures of performance quality. One smaller sample university plans to 
document ranking results in future Structure and Development Plans; however, no 
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strategic actions are planned. Two smaller universities report that in few specific cases, 
CHE Ranking results triggered a revision of student entry criteria (attenuated entrance 
test) and improvements of study programmes and student housing. The other three 
universities did not mention anything in this respect (Table 7). The strongest reported 
strategic action triggered by ranking results is to “have a critical discourse with ranking 
organisations” (Table 7). For all sample universities, “systematic quality management 
and the German Excellence Initiative are much more important than the competition 
over rankings.” Therefore, it is important to remain strong in research; high ranks in 
global league tables are then an emergent effect.
Table 7:  Strategic actions taken because of ranking results 
Strategic actions taken because of ranking results Relative proportion of 
 sample universities
Inform strategic decisions (occasional or case-related) 0/6
Revise policies 0/6
Prioritize research areas 0/6
Change recruitment and promotional criteria 0/6
Revise formal procedures 0/6
Change resource allocation 0/6
Establish departments/entities/programmes 0/6
Revise student entry criteria 1/6
Improve study programmes 1/6
Improve student situation (e. g. housing) 1/6
Close or merge departments/entities/programmes 0/6
Merge with an external organisation 0/6
Recruit new scholars to improve academic staff/student ratio 0/6
Develop capabilities of post-doctoral staff to improve academic staff/
student ratio
0/6
Invite prize-winning scholars to improve Award category 0/6
Increase number of international scholarship 0/6
Set incentives for more publications of academic staff 0/6
Set incentives for more quality publications of academic staff 0/6
Adapt quality measures/indicators to indicators of ranking organisations 1/6
Have critical discourse with ranking organisations 4/6
Include ranking numbers in Structure and Development Plan 1/6
Other 0/6
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The universities’ ranking experts were also asked whether certain aspects of university 
performance are influenced by ranking results to the positive (“helped”), to the nega-
tive (“hindered”) or not at all (“no influence”). It turns out, that no respondent thinks 
that ranking results hindered university performance (Table 8, middle column). Most 
respondents think that four types of performance are supported by high ranks: enhance 
the public image; establish academic partnership; foster international collaboration; 
improve income (Table 8, left column); two lower ranked universities assume that 
rankings have no influence on these performance items (Table 8, first three lines of 
right column). Every, or almost every university representative thinks that all other 
performance aspects are not influenced by ranking results (Table 8, below third line 
of right column); particularly, no influence of rankings is observed on methods and 
contents of teaching and learning; change of criteria in recruitment of researchers, 
teachers and students; update of research methods (Table 8).5 
Table 8:  Influence of ranking results on university performance





No influence of 
ranking results
Enhance public image 5/6 0/6 1/6
Establish academic partnership 4/6 0/6 2/6
Foster international collaboration 4/6 0/6 2/6
Develop internal quality assurance 1/6 0/6 5/6
Set research priorities 1/6 0/6 5/6
Improve staff morale (e. g. general atmosphere; 
staff motivation)
2/6 0/6 4/6
Develop teaching and learning methods 0/6 0/6 6/6
Increase industry partnership 2/6 0/6 4/6
Attract benefactors and sponsorship 2/6 0/6 4/6
Design teaching and learning contents 0/6 0/6 6/6
Change criteria or processes in the recruitment of 
researchers
0/6 0/6 6/6
Change criteria or processes in student recruit-
ment
1/6 0/6 5/6
Improve income 3/6 0/6 3/6
Update research methods 0/6 0/6 6/6
Change criteria and/or processes in the recruit-
ment of teachers
0/6 0/6 6/6
Establish flexible study paths for lifelong learners 0/6 0/6 6/6
Other 0/6 0/6 0/6
5  It has to be pointed out again that the universities do not have systematic impact analyses so far.
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Based on the above results, it must be concluded that the influence of the ranks of 
the universities on their institutional autonomy is very modest, indirect and diffusive. 
Their missions, visions and goals as large, complex and hybrid, autonomous organisa-
tions, which are accountable to many different stakeholders, are not considerably 
influenced by rankings, particularly global league tables. This is in accordance with 
similar results in research-intensive universities in the Nordic region (Elken et al. 2016), 
but in contradiction to claims of some international research (Hazelkorn 2016, pp. 276–
277), beliefs of close advocates of rankings (IREG 2015, pp. 4 ff.) and probably some 
universities in countries which are more keen on rankings, for example in the USA, 
UK and Australia. 
In fact, according to the interviews, “methodological shortcomings make it impossible 
to use rankings as the basis for strategic decisions.” For the sample universities, 
rankings do not implement reliable quality checks and therefore do not provide a basis 
for substantial action towards systematic quality improvement. Thus, current rankings 
cannot be reliably used in quality improvement cycles which are characterised by the 
iterative phases of setting development goals (plan), striving for the goals (do), testing 
the goal achievements (check) and taking measures to further improve goal achieve-
ments if necessary (act) (Deming cycles or pdca cycles). Thus, university rankings as 
we currently know them cannot be integrated in decision-making and strategy forma-
tion by higher education institutions with their complex performance qualities; this 
also implies that, in general and based on actual performance improvements, ranking 
ranks cannot be aspired to systematically. 
For the surveyed universities, “what really counts is quality improvement, not rank-
ings.” Furthermore, “any improvement in ranking positions should and could only be 
a side-effect of quality improvement” (and certainly not vice versa). For university 
strategy and development, subject-oriented profiles related to tradition, developmen-
tal goals in the various performance areas, client/customer demands; funding pro-
grammes (for “excellence”); third-party funding; public financial constraints; higher 
education policy decisions and regulations are the important factors – but not rankings. 
In accordance with this understanding, rankings are usually neither explicitly mentioned 
in mission statements (Leiber 2016) nor in structure and development plans of the 
sample universities. 
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4 Conclusions 
Reflecting the above empirical results and arguments, the following conclusions can 
be summarised: firstly, rankings cannot contribute to systematic enhancement of 
institutional autonomy because current rankings’ results cannot be integrated in strat-
egy and decision-making. The reason is that they are highly aggregated and in many 
respects not sufficiently reliable measures of performance quality, and therefore 
cannot provide the basis of checkable improvement activities. Secondly, for the same 
reason ranking results alone cannot serve empirically reliable accountability needs 
(though such a function is often assumed or favoured by certain stakeholders). None 
of the three functions of accountability mentioned in Section 2 above (constraining 
arbitrary power; sustaining quality of performance; regulating institutions’ activities) 
can be fulfilled by current university rankings without further substantial information. 
Thirdly, like many other quality assessments, rankings do usually not fulfil certain 
quality criteria of accountability (Stensaker/Harvey 2011, p. 15): rankings alone do not 
give a consistently fair assessment of performance; they are often not open for feed-
back and dialogue; because of their methodological weaknesses and possible misin-
terpretations, it is at least controversial whether they have a trust-building effect. 
Fourthly, rankings can contribute to reputation enhancement which is their main 
function. Therefore, fifthly, they can play a part in competitiveness enhancement, 
although on a rather superficial level. Sixthly, rankings could have several possible 
hoped-for, medium-term and long-term, competitive effects which have not yet been 
systematically observed in the sample universities (e. g. increase in number and 
internationalisation of students and staff; improvement in employment prospects for 
graduates; increase in research productivity). 
Thus, the following believes of the International Ranking Expert Group (IREG) cannot 
be confirmed for the sample universities (which may be regarded as representative 
for the German higher education system with some informal justification): “educators 
have accepted” rankings “as a method of quality assessment” (IREG 2015, p. 3); 
“governing bodies of institutions of higher education use rankings” “to select indica-
tors for improving management, to determine policies to achieve excellence”; “govern-
ments use rankings as a quality assurance tool” (ibid. p. 4). In contrast to the expecta-
tion of some observers of the scene, the sample universities do not at all establish 
different strategies for the handling of rankings (actually, they all give the same 
responses about the strengths, weaknesses and threats of rankings), although they 
differ quite a lot in their ranking positions and other properties (such as being funded 
by the German Excellence Initiative; size, subject fields and profiles). 
All in all, it seems obvious that (global) rankings can influence the decision-making and 
strategy of universities only in very moderate and indirect ways: the sample universi-
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ties, for example, do not (and cannot) usually directly respond to league table rankings 
with strategic measures and actions, but only through methodological (and legitimate) 
adjustments of data processing and provision, i. e. by professionalisation of data sup-
ply to the ranking organisations. Though, understandably, universities, particularly their 
leadership, welcome high ranking positions, academic and quality management staff 
nevertheless regard them as a by-product and rate other and more specific and reli-
able performance assessments as far more important which are transparently related 
to quality enhancement. Accordingly, the sample universities’ reactions to rankings do 
not challenge in any sense their organisational identities. In view of the methodologi-
cal shortcomings of rankings, this can only be welcomed – and is in good agreement 
with the concept of “The New Flagship University” (Douglass 2016). In this sense, 
the sample universities are on their way towards competitive, responsible organisations 
based on institutional (academic; staff; financial) autonomy which makes them, in a 
moderate sense, integrative “entrepreneurial” universities (Sam/van der Sijde 2014, 
pp. 901–902). Here, league table rankings play their ambivalent and limited role with 
respect to contributing to competition and accountability functions of integrative uni-
versity governance in sufficiently reliable ways. 
In view of the non-usability of current rankings in systematic university strategy and 
quality enhancement, one may summarise: the more fine-grained and less aggregated 
rankings would be, the more promising would be the options to integrate ranking 
results into strategy and decision-making which should be systematised by Deming 
(pdca) cycles for systematic quality enhancement. The price for this hoped-for increased 
relevance of rankings for strategic governance, however, would be significantly 
increased methodological efforts that would have to be invested into more fine-grained 
and less aggregated rankings – efforts which, in view of the expected benefits, are 
probably too costly for any participant in the ranking game.
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